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Abstract: Marino & Merskin (2019) express hope that providing people with positive information 
about the abilities of sheep (factual appeals) will improve perceptions of them and thus improve 
their welfare. However, these factual appeals can, and do, fail to change perceptions of animals. 
This commentary considers why and when factual appeals fail, and with whom they may be 
effective. 
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Marino & Merskin (M&M, 2019) provide an informative review about the abilities of sheep, about 
which the majority of people are probably unaware. M&M suggest that many people incorrectly 
stereotype sheep as unintelligent. They accordingly recommend that highlighting (counter-
stereotypical) information about sheep abilities (factual appeals) will improve our perception of 
sheep and, by extension, their welfare. However, as we discuss here, the psychological literature 
suggests that such factual appeals can fail because of motivated cognition and self-relevance. 
Motivated cognition is a biased form of reasoning, whereby we interpret information in ways 
favourable to us (Balcetis, 2008); self-relevance refers to the extent to which an animal is used by 
any one individual (e.g., as food, clothing, or entertainment; Piazza & Loughnan, 2016). Hence 
sheep are self-relevant for people who consume sheep (lamb) or other sheep products (e.g., 
wool). 
 
1. Previous commentaries. Previous commentaries have referred to the widespread use of sheep 
as property or commodities (e.g., Baker, 2019; Correia Caeiro, 2019; Davis, 2019; Hermanson, 
2019; Palmer & Sandøe, 2019; Rollin, 2019; Sevillano, 2019; Woodford & Carter, 2019). Some 
suggested that our negative perceptions of sheep result from our treating them as property 
(Correia Caeiro, 2019; Davis, 2019). We will try to expand upon this idea of “sheep as property” 
by considering exactly why it motivates people to perceive them negatively (because of motivated 
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cognition and self-relevance) and why people may therefore dismiss factual appeals regarding 
sheep (cf. Furlong et al., 2018). We also go beyond Davis’s (2019) work by offering some hope and 
considering how factual appeals may be effective with certain audiences. 
 
2. Why may factual appeals fail? People are less willing to help and feel less empathy for self-
relevant animals (e.g., sheep, pigs) compared to non-self-relevant animals (e.g., dogs) (Gradidge, 
2018). To address this problem, it is important to develop interventions that encourage more 
positive perceptions of self-relevant animals. Unfortunately, factual appeals may not work, as 
people often use motivated cognition when evaluating self-relevant animals, including sheep, to 
maintain a favourable self-image. For example, information about the high intelligence of pigs is 
typically ignored (Piazza & Loughnan, 2016). Participants give pigs the same moral status 
regardless of whether pigs are described as having high or low intelligence. This does not apply to 
dogs or fictional animals, neither of whom are self-relevant (e.g., as food) animals. Instead, 
perceived moral status is higher when dogs or fictional animals are described as high in 
intelligence and lower when described as low in intelligence. As both pigs and sheep are self-
relevant profit animals bred for consumption, these findings probably apply to sheep as well, 
suggesting that people will also ignore positive information about the intelligence of sheep. 
Individuals can also ignore the emotional and physiological abilities of animals, including 
their ability to suffer or feel physiological pain (e.g., Bratanova, Loughnan, & Bastian, 2011). Thus, 
not only can animals be construed as unintelligent; they can also be evaluated as incapable of 
suffering and feeling pain, making it morally permissible to consume them. Because of motivated 
cognition and self-relevance, factual appeals may fail; the information they contain is easily 
ignored, enabling individuals to maintain a favourable self-image. Hence factual appeals about 
sheep will not necessarily improve perceptions in consumers for whom sheep are self-relevant. 
 
3. With whom may factual appeals work? People use various strategies to distance themselves 
from animals they consume (Gradidge, Zawisza, & Harvey, under review). Some use direct 
strategies (Rothgerber, 2012), including denial of animal suffering and denial of animal mind. 
These strategies morally justify consuming animals, as their perceived inability to think or suffer 
renders consuming them harmless. Such individuals can maintain a positive self-concept despite 
consuming animals. It is therefore unlikely that people using direct strategies will respond 
positively to factual appeals (Rothgerber, 2012). In fact, they may respond to factual appeals 
negatively (Dowsett, Semmler, Bray, Ankeny, & Chur-Hansen, 2018; Feinberg, Kovacheff, Teper, 
& Inbar, 2019; Rothgerber, 2014). For example, people who deny animals’ emotions or their 
ability to suffer can, following exposure to factual appeals, subsequently view meat consumption 
as more acceptable morally than they did prior to exposure (Feinberg et al., 2019). 
Some meat consumers utilise indirect strategies, which often include dissociation from 
consumed animals (e.g., not thinking about these animals or avoiding information about them; 
Rothgerber, 2012). Factual appeals can disrupt dissociation in individuals who use indirect 
strategies (Dowsett et al., 2018) and can thus encourage them to view animals positively and 
reduce their animal consumption (Kunst & Haugestad, 2017; Kunst & Hohle, 2016). 
Demographically, females (Rothgerber, 2012) or those who value masculinity less (Kildal & Syse, 
2017), and individuals from countries less exposed to animal slaughter (e.g., UK, US, France; Kunst 
& Haugestad, 2017; Tian, Hilton, & Becker, 2016), are more likely to use indirect strategies. Males 
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or those who value masculinity more, and individuals from countries more exposed to animal 
slaughter (e.g., China, Ecuador) are more likely to use direct strategies. Factual appeals may 
therefore be more effective when targeting audiences that use indirect strategies, although 
further research should test this hypothesis directly. 
 
4. Conclusion. Factual appeals based on animals’ abilities should only be used when likely to be 
effective. Further research should investigate how factual appeals can be made more effective, 
particularly amongst individuals using direct strategies. Perhaps individuals can be encouraged to 
use indirect strategies, and then factual appeals would be more effective. Alternatively, research 
may show that we should abandon factual appeals altogether with this group and seek alternative 
interventions. 
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